Samir Arnautović, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Slavko Brkić, University of Zadar, Croatia
Klaus Dethloff, University of Vienna, Austria
Andrej Ule, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
Course "Logical Foundation of Metaphysics" will talk about relations between logic and metaphysics. In the contekst of the course there are different open fields: continental and anglo-american tradition. In this way we will talk about contemporary thinking in modern discours of philosophy and culture studies.
This course deals with the problem of analyzing metaphysical questions and finding a solution to the problem from the viewpoint of theory of meaning. Since the task of philosophy is to answer metaphysical questions, according to many philosophers, premises also become crucial. In this way, metaphysical question- realism or antirealism has as a consequence the fact that antirealism implies rejection of classical semantic validity. Does this mean rejection of classical logic and accepting polivalent, fuzzy, paraconsistent or dialetheic logics? However, theory of meaning decides about adequacy of logic, and not metaphysics, since the validity of logical argument depends only on sentences that it is made of. Does research carry on from theory of meaning through logic to metaphysics or does metaphysics dictate theory of meaning as well as logic? Is this applicable in linguistics in a similar way? When we describe natural language it is normal to adhere to the theory of meaning without inserting metaphysical premises. In which way is the question- realism or antirealism being solved within the framework of linguistics?
What is theory of meaning? Does it describe our language practice? If it does, why do we revise logic? If it does not, why we say what we say? Or, according to Dummet, can language practice become equal with social, political or economical practice? What role then have intention, act and responsibility? Are the key issues of semantic theory when we shall use expression and what we do by that? As a result, the complete meaning of an expression is not made by its usage. Then, the Duhem- Quine claim that theoretical sentences are not tested on experience one by one, but together in a group, becomes questionable.
In what way are logic and metaphisycs interrelated then?
Herthz Hagel, University of Vienna, Austria
Peter Kampits, University of Vienna, Austria
Hijaz Kralj, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Vahidin Preljević, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ante Sesar, Hegelovo društvo - Zadar, Croatia
Goran Švob, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Jure Zovko, University of Zadar, Croatia