The general subject of the Conference is problems of philosophical ontology, epistemology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind that are formulated or solved using formal methods (as defined in logic, mathematics, formal linguistics, theoretical computer science, information science, AI), including possible references to the results of natural and social sciences.
The following special topics will be addressed:
- Use of formal methods in philosophy,
- Philosophical analysis of scientific notions (natural law, matter, change, cause, chance, time, space, uncertainty, quantum phenomena, probability, etc.),
- Philosophical analysis of scientific methods (formalisms, rationality, values, norms, etc.),
- Role and use of scientific notions and methods in philosophy (formal systems in philosophy, critical analysis, systematic philosophy, etc.)
A special session will be devoted to Gödel's ontological proof: reconstructions of the Gödelian idea of the ontological proof on the ground of formalized ontological theories within which the argument is philosophically acceptable. The formalisms are inspired by Gödel’s philosophical views, in connection with some conceptions of classical and modern philosophy (Anselm of Canterbury, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz), and confronted with usual objections related to ontological arguments. This session is organized within the framework of the international research project Gödel’s ontological argument: history, modifications, extensions, and controversies (2013/08/M/HS1/00439, https://sites.google.com/site/ goedelontologicalargument).
Other sessions are planned to be formed in connection with the topics of accepted talks.
Paul Weingartner, University of Salzburg, Austria
André Fuhrmann, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Kordula Świętorzecka: firstname.lastname@example.org
Srećko Kovač: email@example.com
Working language: English
Deadline for abstract submission: November 5, 2014
Extended deadline for abstract submission: December 1, 2014.
Abstracts and work schedule can be download on the right side