Inter-University Centre Dubrovnik

An independent international centre for advanced studies

4 | Exporting Liberalism: New Politics and Old Democracies<BR>/Cosponsored by Friedrich Naumann Stiftung/

Duration
26 Apr 2004 - 28 Apr 2004
Language
English
Status
REGULAR
Conference directors:
Walter Mller-Jentsch, N/A, N/A
Conference description:
INTER-UNIVERSITY CENTRE DUBROVNIK
Don Frana Bulića 4, HR-20000 Dubrovnik, Croatia
Tel: +385 20 413 626, Fax: +385 20 423 628
E-mail: iuc@iuc.hr
www.iuc.hr

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: Exporting Liberalism New Polities and Old Democracies

Dubrovnik, 26-28 April, 2004


Conference Directors: Shlomo Avineri, Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Silva Menarić, Zagreb

Conference Content:
Recent US intervention in Iraq and foremost the postconflict intentions there brought into full daylight more than a century old problem of Western democracies: how far is it possible to go in deploying liberal democratic institutions and applying them to surroundings with different traditions. The Balkans, partly Eastern Europe and now islamic states and political cultures clearly showed that the applicability of such Western actions was not being thought through, let alone defined. Neither military nor social scientists, did their analytical jobs. The goal of the Conference is to define the void, to give it names and topics and to start off further examinations.

Invited speakers: Kevin D. Krause, Detroit; Silva Meznaric, Zagreb; Nenad Miscevic, Rijeka; Zarko Puhovski, Zagreb; Vesna Pusic, Zagreb; Andras Sajo, Budapest; Dan Schueftan, Haifa; Aleksandar Stulhofer, Zagreb; Ivan Vejvoda, Beograd; Mitja Zagar, Ljubljana.


Participants registered (by March 15, 2004): 12, plus Divided Societies Course Graduate Students (15).

Programme:

Monday, April 26 Topic: Politics of Transition; Liberalism and New Democracies
09.00 19.00 in Eastern Europe. The Mixed Success in Post-Communist Societies; Internal Conditions and External Forces.
16.00 19.00 Speakers: Pusić, Vejvoda, agar, Sajo, tulhofer

Tuesday, April 27 Topic: Two Concepts of Freedom; Exporting Whose Liberalism?
09.00 19.00 Speakers: Krause, Mičević, Puhovski
16.00 19.00


Wednesday, April 28
09.00 13.00 Topics: The Democratization of the Arab World; Cultural and Political
Pluralism. Democracy, Democratization and Peace.
16.00 19.00 Edward Said's Legacy: Causes and Excuses.
Speakers: Shueftan, Menarić

Working languages: English


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Children: services available. Contact Secretariat.

Contact Person: Ms Silva Meznaric
silva.meznaric@zg.htnet.hr
Tel/fax: 385 1 4614208


Compiled: 02/04/2004












Grant: The Conference has been selected by Friedrich Naumann Stiftung as 2004 IUC Fee Grantee.


INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE:
Exporting Liberalism New Polities and Old Democracies
Dubrovnik, 26-28 April, 2004
Monday, 26 April, 10:00-13:00


Andras Sajo
Liberalism on back burner the Hungarian experience
Outline






INTER-UNIVERSITY CENTRE DUBROVNIK
Don Frana Bulića 4, HR-20000 Dubrovnik, Croatia
Tel: +385 20 413 626, Fax: +385 20 423 628
E-mail: iuc@iuc.hr
www.iuc.hr


Clarification. Liberalism here refers to European (19th century) liberalism with strong emphasis on individual liberty and self-determination. The case study concerns Hungary but I take that the conclusions are applicable in most East Central European countries.
In a strange combination of lack of understanding and the desire to be Western the Hungarian constitutional and early institutional transition to democracy was carried out under the spell of liberalism. Liberalism was, however, unsustainable under the pressure coming from (deeply rooted) welfarism, bureaucratic self-interest, clientelism, corporativism, nationalism. IN a few years liberalism became a dirty word and liberal principled politics is considered politically suicidal. Deliberate abuse of liberal positions also contributed to such developments. International and domestic considerations, however, did not allow for an open rupture with liberal fundamentals. Instead of it a slow erosion took place. The erosion is well demonstrated in Hungarian Constitutional Court decisions.
The phenomenon is partly post-communist, partly it can be explained by a general trend in political liberalism that was already observed by Lord Acton, namely that liberty being dear to minorities such minorities have to find allies; such alliances resulted in deformation and disaster. (See also the erosion of liberalism under Bismarck and in the Austro-Hungarian Empire after 1867.) Nevertheless, the post 1989 Hungarian public institutions were formed in a liberal spirit and hypocrisy and impotence helps such liberal spirit to exercise a ghost-like influence.




INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE:
Exporting Liberalism New Polities and Old Democracies
Dubrovnik, 26-28 April, 2004
Wednesday, 28 April, 10:00-13.00




Andras Sajo
Liberalism on back burner the Hungarian experience
Outline









INTER-UNIVERSITY CENTRE DUBROVNIK
Don Frana Bulića 4, HR-20000 Dubrovnik, Croatia
Tel: +385 20 413 626, Fax: +385 20 423 628
E-mail: iuc@iuc.hr
www.iuc.hr


Cultural and Political Preconditions for
Modernization, Democratization and Peaceful Coexistence
in the Middle East
Dan Schueftan


It would take a revolutionary change of present trends in the Arab World to produce a climate conducive for modernization, democratization and peaceful coexistence in the Middle East. While the global and some of the regional circumstances have become more favorable in recent decades for a positive change in this direction than they have been for a long time, the most important precondition for progress on these issues - the cultural predisposition - is not only lagging behind, but indeed becoming more difficult than ever before.
The external circumstances - global and regional - became more favorable thanks to the collapse of the Soviet empire and the trend towards democratization that swept the globe. The first deprived the radical and most oppressive regimes in the region from their superpower shield, which rendered them immune to regime change. The new trend towards democratization may not have produced liberal democracies or open societies, but it proved that even in a traditional and authoritarian environment, a gradual process of political reform could provide a measure of freedom hitherto unknown in these parts, that can offer hope for further progress in this direction in the future.
The Arab states are the only major exception to this trend, conspicuous because unsubstantiated expectations of democratization in the Arab World have been prevalent in the West for so long. Needless to say, the Arab World is not a monolith in that (or any other) regard. Jordan and Egypt offer a far more relaxed and palatable version of authoritarianism than the brutality of Sadam Husseins Iraq, the oppression of Assads republican dynasty, or the corrupt and profoundly irresponsible Palestinian cleptocracy. But beyond these differences, there is a political and cultural reality that transcends boundaries and regimes, which proved to date to constitute an insurmountable impediment to any major change towards modernization and democratization.
The Arabs exhibited in the last two centuries unique inadequacies in coping with the modern world. The aggressive challenge of the West effected most parts of the world and caused major disruptions of traditional societies everywhere, but the Arabs had a special difficulty meeting this challenge. This difficulty is rooted in the pervasive perception that the Arabs are destined for greatness and glory at the present and in the future, to match the outstanding achievements of their ancestors in the distant past. While every culture, nation and creed celebrate their unique distinctions, the Arabs tend, more than others, to dwell on the juxtaposition of their heritage of political and military power, with their present impotence and national humiliation. While others may lament their fall from greatness but carry on, Arabs often fail to come to terms with the gap between the reverence their creativity and innovation won them in the distant past, and the disrespect they suffer because of the failure they admit to in the present, and their dim perspective for the foreseeable future.
For many years, hopes Arabs entertained for a profound change in the balance of power were potent enough to keep the mainstream in the Arab World from despair. In the second half of the twentieth century, the most conspicuous manifestations of such hopes were Abd al-Nassers messianic movement in the 1950s and 1960s, and the accumulation of massive political and economic resources thanks to the energy crisis in the 1970s.
But since the 1980s, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, mainstream Arab elites came to realize that not only the present is depressing for their society in this regard, but also that the foreseeable future may not be much better. Some of them came to recognize that the problems the Arab society is suffering from are structural, and may lead toward a dead-end. In the last two decades this realization is spreading and deepening more than ever. In recent years it became acceptable to the point in which even Arab leaders sometimes confess to the weaknesses and inadequacies of their own countries and offer little hope for a speedy and fundamental solution.
It is probably this enormous and inexplicable gap between the world as it should have been and the world as it really is that can explain, more than any other single cause, the prevalent gloom, sometime even despair, in the Arab World. It may also explain their severe political and cultural consequences. If two centuries of persistent attempts to bridge this gap have come to naught, if all attempts to emulate the West, as well as the attempts to defy its superior power and match its achievements have only led to Arab self-admitted impotence and inability to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century, something must be profoundly wrong. Many in the Arab World have reached the conclusion that only an all-encompassing conspiracy can explain how those destined for greatness are humiliated in their own region, while those condemned to subservience enjoy power and command respect.
In such a conspirative environment, Modernization, democratization, and peaceful coexistence are presented with a formidable impediment. A determination to deal with the world in a realistic way and understand the real causes of ones problems, may not be a sufficient condition for a modern and peaceful democracy, but it is certainly a necessary condition. In an environment in which the CIA is perceived as responsible for the collapse of the Twin Towers, the Jewish Lobby as dictating American foreign policy, and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion as the root cause of the Arab predicament, it is difficult to promote any of the three. An addiction to such a perception of history and political life, not only makes it impossible to appraise the problems the Arabs are facing; it also represents an abdication of responsibility for their development, and hence, all but precludes the chance to deal with these problems effectively.
Such abdication of responsibility seems to be the greatest cultural obstacle for Arabs and much of the Third World in their endeavor to extricate themselves from perpetual inaptitude, poverty and failure. Instead of taking responsibility, they resort too often to the excuses of Colonialism, Globalization and Occupation. Colonialism indeed had a disruptive, sometimes horrible, effect on the lives and prospects of the colonized peoples, but pinning the long-lasting failure of these societies on colonialism half a century after its abolition simply does not hold water. Globalization is often unfair and indeed extremely difficult to cope with for underdeveloped societies, but some have worked very hard to benefit from it, while other focus on handouts and loan-forgiveness, not even trying to adjust themselves to the new reality.
One generation ago, the Arabs were given an opportunity of a magnitude no one else was fortunate enough to benefit from, when the oil producers accumulated trillions of dollars in revenues, for goods they did nothing to produce or develop. This provided the Arab States - chiefly the oil producers, but also the other states, who received many billions of dollars from them since the 1970s - with an economic instrument that could have catapulted their economies and societies to a much improved position of competition in the global market. One generation later the Arab States are worse off than they were before this enormous bonanza. The unique chance was squandered on corruption and war.
Palestinians and other Arabs did suffer from Israeli and American occupation, but the attempts to pin their failure in the fields of democratization, peaceful coexistence and modernization on that occupation is more an excuse than the fundamental reason. The occupation came about, in the first place, because those who came to be occupied refused peaceful coexistence and opted for war. It persisted primarily because they refused to change course towards compromise.
The failure of Egypt, Syria and Iraq, or the Palestinians, to offer their societies a chance of democratization or modernization, did not start with the Israeli or American occupation. When Israel terminated its occupation of Egyptian territory a quarter of a century ago, this did not change one bit the autocratic nature of the Egyptian regime. When the Palestinian national movement took over the populated territories in the beginning of the Oslo Process, it introduced a corrupt, violent and autocratic system that often limited basic freedoms even more than the Israeli occupation. Although it is not a democracy by any stretch of the imagination, occupied Lebanon is doing better in this respect, than the Syrian occupier.
Colonialism, Globalization and Occupation may sound as convincing excuses, but the real issue is responsibility, or rather, the lack thereof. Addiction to these excuses is a major impediment to an effective response to the real problems. Conspirative theories only deepen this addiction. All successful attempts to bring about modernization and democracy started with a bold look of ones own society, rather than with blaming evil external forces. While the Arab World is somewhat more open recently to admit many of its shortcomings, it is only very rarely willing to accept responsibility for them, or to make the major changes that are required in order to amend them. One important example is the status of women in the Arab-Muslim World. While there can be no disagreement about the crucial role of womens equality as a precondition to democratization and modernization, the Islamization of large parts of Arab society exacerbated, rather than alleviated the problem.
Hopes concerning democratization and modernization in the Arab World as a result of free access to information or external influence were rapidly shattered at the end of the twentieth century. The instruments of information that opened much of the world outside the Middle East and helped produce a more open and pluralistic society seldom had this effect in the Arab World. Satellite Television did expose Arabs to criticism of their own regime and brought more pictures and voices from the outside world, but its most potent effect was to fabricate a convoluted version of history and world events, in which Arabs are invariably the innocent victims, while others (chiefly the U.S. and Israel) habitually represent ultimate evil. The Internet proved again that what counts in the existing environment in the Middle East is rather what Arabs seek to confirm then what they have available to challenge their perceptions and prejudices. The new options of civil society proved immeasurably more effective in the hands of radical Islamic Movements than in the service of those who seek modernization, democratization and peaceful coexistence.
What we have seen in the Arab World and part of the Third World at the turn of the century, was much more an attempt to re-define and distort democracy human rights and other basic values of the open society system, in a way designed to legitimize the autocratic, totalitarian and oppressive regimes, than a willingness to progress towards a more pluralistic system. The UN and other international organizations play a very negative role in this respect, since they are dominated by such regimes and because their success to distort democratic terms beyond recognition is not even seriously challenged, let alone de-legitimized by the European democracies.
All this does not mean that there is no hope for the Arab World ever changing towards democracy, modernity and peaceful coexistence. It only helps explain why precious little has changed recently in a positive direction and why significant relevant indicators point in the opposite direction. It also suggests that in the present environment the necessary cultural preconditions are extremely difficult to meet and take a long time to produce major results. The problem is that time is not neutral: While those in the Arab World who want these changes struggle with the impediments discussed above, they can offer only little consolation to the Arab political public that suffers everyday from the consequences of the Arab failure in the last generations to adapt to the modern world. These revolutionary changes are not easy even for a self-assured and successful society; for one that is frustrated and humiliated by most everybody else passing it by, it is so much more difficult.


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Chapter 12
SOCIO-CULTURAL VALUES, ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL
STABILITY AS CORRELATES OF
TRUST IN THE EUROPEAN UNION*
Ivan Rimac
Ivo Pilar Institute for Social Research
Zagreb
Aleksandar tulhofer
Faculty of Philosophy
Zagreb
ABSTRACT
This paper provides a comparative empirical analysis of social values
in Croatia, the European Union (EU), the countries joining in the first
round, and a group of European countries outside the EU. Following up
on the analysis of the data obtained in international research into European
values carried out at the end of the 90s on national samples of most
European countries, the authors have endeavoured to determine the differences
in the spread of post-material values and the scope of social capital.
The objective is to define where, in terms of social values, Croatia is currently
located, and thus to sketch out its readiness or lack of readiness for
joining the EU. In the second part, the paper offers a comparative analysis
of factors that affect the level of public confidence in the EU.
* The authors took an equal part in the writing of this paper. We would like to thank the
anonymous reviewer for comments and proposals that have removed at least some of the
shortcomings.
Key words:
socio-cultural values, post-materialism, social capital, transition costs,
confidence in the European Union, Croatia
INTRODUCTION
According to figures from the Ministry for European Integration
(www.mei.hr), most citizens of Croatia want to join the EU. Although
in 2003 the percentage of those who think it is necessary to join the EU
has fallen since 2000 (74% as against 78%), almost three quarters of the
respondents still think that such a course of events would be positive.
Is this entirely an assessment of personal gain, neglecting any possible
effects of integration on the country as a whole? Figures show a logical
link between the assessment of personal and national benefit from joining
the EU. Thus, 66% expect a higher standard of living as a consequence,
and as many as 75% expect general progress.
The objective of this paper is to show how distant from or close
to the EU Croatia is from the point of view of values. We are interested
in how much the values that we consider stimulating to development
are widespread in Croatia as compared with the EU, or how much, to
put it another way, the EU is different from us. The magnitude of this
difference is important both for a country that wants to become a member
(greater differences imply greater difficulties in adjustment to the
EU system of standards) and for those who decide to take on the new
members. An example of the latter point can be found in the muted
voices that consider the values in Turkey, a Muslim country, impossible
to harmonise with those of the European tradition.
In order to make the comparison, the distribution of values, or
sets of values, is presented separately for three groups of countries: the
EU members, the accession countries, and the countries that are not part
of the EU. In the empirical analyses that follow, we start from the
assumption that individual values that reflect social, political or economic
dimensions can be concisely presented and analyzed (tulhofer
and Rimac, 2002; Fuchs and Klingemann, 2002). In order to do so, we
use three theoretical models. The first of them, the theory of post-materialism,
defines the change in global values as a shift from materialist
to post-materialist values. The second model, the social capital theory,
focuses on social cohesion, social trust and cooperativeness. Recent
research (Inglehart, 1997; Putnam, 1993; Torsvik, 2000) has pointed to
302
a positive correlation between post-materialism and social capital on
the one hand, and economic growth and political development on the
other. The third model introduces some specific features of the process
of post-communist transition (tulhofer, 2000).
Since in this paper we also wish to sketch out the measures that
could stimulate convergence in values, in the second part of the paper
we analyse the structure of trust and confidence in the EU. In this part we
identify the political, economic and social predictors of trust in the EU.
In the next step, we use this analysis to outline a set of specific recommendations
regarding Croatia's ambition to become a member of the EU.
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:
THE THREE MODELS
The importance of culture, of specific social values, of institutions
and manners (tradition) for economic growth and political values
is no longer controversial. This is best shown by the recently inaugurated
development project of the World Bank called Social Capital for
Development (www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital). However, the
question of the empirical measurement of social values is more complex
and controversial (Grix, 2001). In order to be able to avoid making
conclusions on the basis of simple indicators such as the question:
Do you support democracy?, which avoids the issue of the different
understandings of democracy and of conforming to social expectations,
we base the analysis of the distribution of specific values on three theoretical
constructs. Each of these is an interlinked set of political, economic
and socio-cultural values.
Model of post-materialist change
The model of social change proposed by the American political
scientist Ronald Inglehart is one of the most theoretically elegant and
empirically most investigated theories of globalisation (Abramson and
Inglehart, 1995; Inglehart, 1997). The model starts off from the
assumption that social development is no chaotic and accidental
process, but is inextricably linked with a specific structure of values
(Inglehart, 1995). Although the claim that socio-cultural values can be
grouped into coherent sets, value orientations, is not new, the innova-
303
tiveness of Ingleharts model rests in the thesis that value orientations
are both the cause and effect of economic and political development. In
this way, there is a high degree of similarity between the developed
countries, as well as between the less developed countries, but not
between these two groups. Ingleharts assumptions, it can easily be seen,
are based on the modernization theory and postulate linear development.
When he talks of value systems, Inglehart distinguishes three:
traditional, modern and post-modern. The last two are global consequences
of the industrial or the post-industrial revolution. As for the
post-modern orientation, its beginning is usually placed in the 1960s
when in the developed countries of the West the post-modern transition
commenced; this was characterised by the spread of what were called
post-materialist values. Table 1 presents in a condensed way the transformation
of values described. At the micro level, the most recent
changes are shown in the growth of the number of post-materialists,
particularly in the younger generations (Abramson and Inglehart, 1995;
Inglehart, 1997). At the same time, there is a decline in the popularity
of materialist values, which were dominant in industrial societies.
Table 1 Materialist and post-materialist value systems
304
Modern societies
(domination of materialist
values)
Post-modern societies
(domination of postmaterialist
values)
Fundamental social goal Economic growth and
political stability
Development of human
rights and liberties
Personal ends Maximising utility;
growth in purchasing
power
Maximising individuality;
development of personal
identities
Central social authority Rational and legal (laws) Self-regulation
What is post-materialist development conditioned by? According
to Inglehart, it is mainly the consequence of the growth of prosperity. The
relationship between dominant social values and the level of social development
shown primarily through standard of living Inglehart defines in
terms of two linked hypotheses (Inglehart, 1995). The first of them, the
shortage hypothesis, puts forward the idea that individual preferences are
caused by the socio-economic situation. In conditions of shortage,
motives concerning pure existence and survival prevail, and in conditions
of abundance, those that transcend them. The socialisation hypothesis, on
the other hand, offers a mechanism of value internalisation, stressing the
crucial importance of the process of early socialisation. Growing up in a
stable environment, security and prosperity stimulates the internalisation
and development of post-modern values. The rising importance of the
post-materialist value orientation is seen in the new civil initiatives, in the
growth of ecological sensitivity, in growing tolerance, multiculturalism
and in cosmopolitanism, in the increasing emphasis on human rights and
personal identities, the strengthening of the idea of self-regulation and the
rejection of classical political ideologies.i Thus the expectation of the
model is that support for the EU will reflect the spread of post-materialist,
transnational values in the national population.ii
Social capital theory
The idea of social capital is probably the most popular of all
those that have emerged in the social sciences in the last ten years (Grix,
2001; Hospers and Van Lochem, 2002).iii The reason for this should be
sought in the dissatisfaction with the predictive capacities of the classical
theory of modernisation, according to which growth and development
are predicated on universal and rational institutions. Against this
postulate, a series of investigations have pointed to the mediating role of
culture, which in some cases supports and in other cases thwarts or holds
up development. Specific norms and collective habits can, behind the
faade of formal institutions, make a mockery of market and democratic
competition. An unpropitious cultural matrix results in chronic economic,
political and social backwardness (tulhofer, 2001:53-78). The
first appears in inadequate growth, the second in prolonged political
instability and undemocratic proceedings, and the last in general lack of
trust, cynicism, opportunism and a high level of social pathology.
What is the general trait of a propitious cultural matrix?
According to social capital theorists (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993;
Torsvik, 2000; Fukuyama, 2000), its features are mutual trust, generally
accepted standards of cooperation and social networks or links between
members of the community. According to the influential Putnam study
(1993) of the development of Italy, the whole of these features social
capitaliv - is the generator of economic development and political stability.
Unlike the closed circle of underdevelopment, in societies/communities
rich in social capital, a positive development loop is at work: cultural
habits produce wealth that then in turn increases the social capital.
305
Empirically, social capital consists of three dimensions (Figure
1). The first of them, trust, denotes initial readiness to cooperate and
not only with members of the family or acquaintances (Fukuyama,
1995; Mistal, 1996). The second dimension, association/connectedness,
and the related collective actions, make possible the direct experience
of cooperation and its advantages, such as the fulfilment of interests that
are beyond the scope of individual action. Social linkage or networking
thus works as a school for trust and collaboration. The last dimension,
respect for standards or civility,v is at the same time the result of the
working of the first two dimensions and it is their support and buttress.
Figure 1 Structure of social capital
306
Respect for
norms (civility)
Association
Trust
What kind of relation between social capital and trust in the EU
does this model predict? Although the theoretical link is not yet clearly
expressed, one should expect (as in the case of post-materialism) that
social capital should have a positive effect on the way the EU is seen,
both because of its encouragement of social and economic cooperation
and because of the links related to the possibility of wider networking.
But an alternative interpretation is also possible. If the process of
European integration, and hence the institutions and practice of the EU,
are seen as threats to established, local and national, networks (McLaren,
2002), social capital will be negatively correlated with trust in the EU.
Situational reaction model
Neither the post-materialism nor the social capital theory takes
into account the specific, transitional features of European post-communist
societies. Within the universal postulates of the Inglehart theory,
such socio-cultural specificities are of secondary importance and are
responsible for short-lasting oscillations in the general trend of postmaterialism
(Inglehart, 1995). In the second model, socio-cultural traits
are central, but only in a quantitative sense (Putnam, 1993). Countries
can thus be distinguished according to quantity but not according to
type (or quality) of social capital.
Considering that both models display a tendency to neglect the
transitional reality of post-communism - a process of such great importance
for the countries of C, S and SE Europe - we have decided to
include a third explanatory model into our theoretical framework. Its
role is to contribute to the interpretation of the structure of trust in the
EU by taking into account socioeconomic costs of transition.
The situational reaction model (tulhofer, 2000:149-177)
assumes that in moments of major social changes, the perception and
evaluation of the current economic political and social conditions will
determine the dominant values. For example, observation of a large number
of injustices, irregularities and abuses during the process of economic
and political changes, and, in particular, the failure to penalise them,
will result in widespread cynicism and opportunism. Starting out from
the definition of post-communism as fundamental change in economic,
political and social life, one accompanied by vast transitional costs (individual
and collective), the model predicts that the perception of the EU
will be considerably affected by the respondents assessment of the
course of the transitional processes to date. Since the citizens of countries
that do not belong to the EU know as a rule very little about the EU institutions
and their activities, their estimate of the EU will be a reflection of
the effectiveness of the relevant domestic institutions (Anderson, 1998).
METHODOLOGY
Sample
In the analyses we use data collected in the third wave of the
European Values Survey (EVS), a research project that started in 1980
with the aim of providing systematic monitoring of the value orientations
307
(concerning religion, morality, work, politics and society) of the citizens
in European countries. The initial survey in 10 Western European countries
in 1981 was extended in 1990 and, again, in 1999/2000 when it covered
thirty-three countries. Thus the data collected in 1999/2000 are a
good basis for the comparison of the values and standpoints of people in
different European countries. In all the countries, a single questionnaire
was used and rigorous procedures and checks were used to secure the
equivalence of questions after translation. In each country a probabilistic
sample of the over-18 population was polled, and all the samples consisted
of at least 1,000 respondents. The Croatian part of the EVS was carried
out by a research team led by J. Baloban of the Catholic Theology
Faculty in Zagreb (Rimac and rpi, 2000). Under the guidance of the
University of Tilburg Research Centre (WORC, Tilburg University) and
the Central Archive in Cologne, data were checked and aggregated
enabling comparative analyses. In this paper we use the fourth revision
of the 1999/2000 dataset.
Instruments
The measure of post-materialism as opposed to materialism represents
a standard recoding of the selection of preferred objectives of
the country. The respondents were asked to choose two out of four
items offered (keeping order in the state; giving more rights to people
to go on record about important decisions of the government; fight
against the rise in prices; protection of liberty of speech). Their task was
to select the first and the second most important societal goal in their
respective countries. If they chose the first and third goal, which correspond
to materialism, then they were classified as materialists. If they
chose two goals that suggest post-materialist viewpoints, they were
classified as post-materialist, while respondents that chose one materialist
and one post-materialist goal were placed in the mixed orientation
group. In the regression analysis, a greater value of the index of postmaterialism
indicates a greater acceptance of post-materialist values.
The opportunism index is an average response value on two questions
asking if it is acceptable to evade tax if you have the chance and to
receive bribes at work. The correlation between the variables is moderate
(r = .38). Higher values on the scale indicate greater opportunism.
The trust in the institutions of the countrys political system index
is the arithmetical mean of answers on a scale of one to four, in which
lower values denote complete trust, and higher values complete lack of
308
trust in the institutions evaluated. The following institutions were included
in the index: church, army, education system, press, unions, police,
parliament, civil service, social security, health care system and judiciary.
The reliability of the index is satisfactory (Cronbach alpha = .83).
The Social networking indicator, that is, the indicator of the
involvement of citizens in civil initiatives is a variable that measures
the frequency of spending time with people in clubs and voluntary
organisations (non-governmental sector). Respondents were given a
scale with the following responses: not at all, a few times a year, once
or twice a month, every week.
Generalised trust was measured by the following question: In
general, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you have
to be cautious in your dealings with people?
Trust in norms was measured indirectly, through respondent's perception
of the respect for/violation of norms in his or her community. The
logic of using this perception of civility index was as follows: the more
others respect norms, the greater the motivation of the respondent to do
the same. The likelihood that an actor will respect norms depends, substantially,
on his or her perception of the relevant procedures of others.
Such behavioural strategy is doubly rational in a cost/benefit sense, as
well as socially (maintaining one's reputation). The perception of civility
index is the arithmetical mean of answers to ten questions about how
widespread violation of norms is in respondent's place of residence.vi A
scale with four points was used (almost all, many, some, almost no one).
The reliability of the index is satisfactory (Cronbach alpha = .80).
Satisfaction with the development of democracy is measured by
the question: How satisfied are you with the development of democracy
in our country? As an indicator of satisfaction with the government
we used the following question: People have various opinions
about the manner and system in which the country is governed. On the
scale indicate your opinion about how things are. Respondents were
offered a 10-point scale, with 1 being very bad and 10 being very good.
GDP data were not an original part of the EVS, but were added
subsequently in order to quantify the effect of national economy on
respondents' attitudes and values.
RESULTS I: SOCIO-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
In this section we present the results of the statistical analyses of
value orientations. The first part is a descriptive analysis of the spread
309
of the distinct value orientations, particularly of post-materialism and
those related to social capital, in three groups of countries: EU members,
accession countries and countries that are not members, including
Croatia. We consider this discussion an important one, especially in the
light of the future of the collective European identity that the idea of the
EU idea postulates. A European people are not imaginable, as
Prentoulis (2001:196) observes, as an outcome of common history or
culture, but only as the product of newly formed political values.
Figure 2 Comparison of percent of materialists, postmaterialists and mixed
type persons in different countries (%)
310
materialist mixed postmaterialists
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
0
10
Austria
Italy
Sweden
Netherlands
Belgium
Spain
France
Germany
Greece
Denmark
Ireland
Finland
Portugal
EU countries
Slovenia
Czech Republic
Poland
Lithuania
SlovakiaLatvia
Estonia
Hungary
Accession countriesCroatia
Turkey
Romania
BelarusUkraine
Bulgaria
Russia
Countries outside the EU
Figure 2 shows the distribution of post-material values. In line
with the results of an earlier work (Inglehart and Baker, 2000), our data
show considerable differences in the presence of post-materialism in
the three groups of countries (F=1047.7; p<.01). According to expectations
based on Ingleharts assumption of the link between prosperity
and the abandonment of materialist values, post-materialism appears
most often in EU countries, and most seldom in the group of non-EU
countries. However, Croatia deviates markedly from the non-EU group
average. It can easily be seen that the level of post-materialist values in
Croatia is on a level with the EU average. The fact that the same is also
true for Turkey and for Slovenia (in the accession group) suggests a
combination of economic (standard of living) and non-economic (exposure
to Western cultural influences) sources for post-materialism.
Figure 3 Generalized trust in different countries (%)
311
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
DenmarkSweden
NetherlandsFinland
SpainIrelandGermany
Austria
ItalyBelgium
Great BritainGreece
France
PortugalEU countries
Lithuania
Czech RepublicEstonia
HungarySlovenia
PolandLatvia
Slovakia
Accession countriesCroatiaBelarus
Ukraine
Bulgaria
Russia
Romania
Turkey
Countries outside the EU
cannot be too careful most people can be trusted
Figure 3 presents the first indicator of social trust, the first of the
three dimensions of social capital. This is the so-called generalised
trust, that is, the level of initial readiness to cooperate with unknown
individuals. Analysis points out the different levels of generalised trust
(F=570.01, p<.01). According to expectation, it is greatest in the EU
countries, irrespective of the variations expressed inside the group. The
highest levels of generalised trust are in the countries of northern
Europe (Denmark, Sweden, Holland and Finland), and the lowest in the
Mediterranean part (Portugal, France and Greece). The difference in the
level of trust between the EU accession countries and the countries outside
the EU is not statistically significant. Although generalised trust is
a dominant feature only in the countries of Northern Europe which
indicates that the differences should be perhaps conceived as differences
in the levels of mistrust, rather than trust one should point out
that generalised trust in Croatia is twice as low as the EU average.
Figure 4 Comparison of trust in political institutions in different countries (%)
312
100
80
60
40
20
0
Finland
Denmark
IrelandAustriaSweden
NetherlandsPortugalFranceSpain
Belgium
GermanyGreat Britain
ItalyGreeceEU countriesPoland
Latvia
SlovakiaSlovenia
Estonia
Hungary
Lithuania
Czech RepublicAccession countries
CroatiaTurkey
Romania
Belarus
UkraineRussisBulgaria
Countries outside the EU
not at all not very much quite a lot a great deal
The second indicator of social trust is trust in institutions. Figure
4 shows the aggregate level of trust in 11 social institutions. As in the
previous case, trust is most expressed in the EU countries followed by
the non-EU countries (F=239.33, p<.01). As for this important segment
of social stability, the level of trust in Croatia is the same as the mean
for the accession countries. Among these countries, trust in institutions
is most widespread in Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia, which
could be the consequence of economic growth (Poland, Lithuania),
political and economic stability (Slovenia), and the abolition of authoritarian
government in the case of Slovakia.
Figure 5 Trust in the reigning standards of society - the civility index (%)
313
100
80
60
40
20
0
Greece
Portugal
Italy
Ireland
Great BritainFrance
Finland
Austria
Germany
SpainBelgium
Netherlands
Sweden
Denmark
EU countries
Hungary
Slovakia
Cech Republic
Estonia
Poland
Lithuania
Latvia
Accession countries
Croatia
Turkey
Romania
Bulgaria
Russia
BelarusUkraine
Countries outside the EU
almost everyone cheats many do
some do almost no one cheats
Figure 5 presents the last indicator of social trust: trust in social
norms. As already explained, the perception of civility index that is
used here does not measure trust in (and accordingly respect for) norms
directly, but indirectly. It points to the likelihood that the respondent
will respect the norms. The more widespread, in the respondents opinion,
the violation of norms, the less likely it is that s/he will trust the
same norms. The basic assumption here is, of course, that the respondents
are at least relatively rational, that is that their actions are not
independent of experience and tactical (interactional) considerations. In
a milieu in which norms are not respected, legalistic behaviour is very
expensive both financially and in terms of reputation.
According to our results, perception of civility is most widespread
again in EU countries, with the level being highest in Holland,
Denmark and Sweden, and lowest in the Mediterranean zone (Greek,
Italy, Portugal). The highest infringement of standards, that is the lowest
level of civility, is perceived by respondents in the transition countries,
equally in the accession countries and in the non-EU countries.vii
If we consider the graph in more detail, the lack of difference between
the accession countries and the countries outside the EU (both groups
differ from the EU countries (EU / F = 96.2, p<.01) is the consequence
of the extremely widespread perception of the infringement of norms in
Hungary. If we subtract this country from the analysis, the level of
civility in the accession countries becomes statistically higher than that
of the countries outside the EU. In this respect it should be stressed that
the perception of civility in Croatia is somewhere between the average
of the EU countries and the accession countries.
Along with trust and respect for norms, social connectedness
(association) is the third key dimension of social capital. Instead of the
standard way of measuring the density of social networks, which uses
the percentage of respondents involved in voluntary organisations, we
decided here on a different approach. Since the usual measurement is
not sensitive to the different levels of members' activity (Putnam,
2000), we measured the level of association by the amount of free time
that respondent spent in activities of the NGO of which s/he is a member
(Figure 6).
All three groups of countries differ according to the level of
social connectedness (F=834.63, p<.01). Bearing in mind that association
is positively related to civil society, the expected order is expected:
the density is greatest in the EU countries, and lowest in the non-
EU countries. Considering the theoretical and empirical link between
trust and social connectedness (Fuchs and Klingemann, 2002), this corroborates
the findings on trust, and stresses the difficulties the development
of civil society meets in countries with trust deficit (Mishler and
Rose, 1997).
As in most of the previous analyses, Croatia shows an aberration
here from the other countries in the non-EU group, too. The density of
social connectedness in Croatia is greater than the average of the accession
group. How is this to be explained? There are two possible reasons.
According to the first, Croatia - like Slovenia and unlike the other post-
314
socialist countries surveyed - inherited some kind of foundation of civic
organisation, thanks to the greater openness of the former Yugoslav
regime. This enabled the more rapid development of the civil society sector.
According to the second interpretation, the rapid development of civic
associations is primarily the consequence of the war or, more precisely, of
local and international humanitarian initiatives prompted by the war.
Figure 6 Free time spent in Non-Governmental Organizations in different
countries (%)
315
not at all few times a year
once/twice a month every week
Denmark
Netherlands
Ireland
Germany
Belgium
Sweden
Great Britain
Austria
France
Finland
Portugal
Spain
Italy
Greece
EU countries
Slovenia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Lithuania
Accession countries
Croatia
Bulgaria
Belarus
Russia
Ukraine
Turkey
Romania
Countries outside the EU
100
90
80
60
70
50
40
30
20
10
0
The next two graphs present data related to the situational reaction
model. Table 2 offers a comparative view of respondent's evaluation of
democracy in his/her country. In Eastern European countries this is an
indicator of the satisfaction with the basic outcome of the political transition.
Consequently, one should be cautious in interpreting the differences
between countries with a longer democratic tradition and those with rela-
tively little experience of democratic rule. It is possible that the threshold
of sensitivity to mistakes and abuse in the democratic procedure is lower
in the first group, simply because the citizens have become accustomed to
high standards of political behaviour and general political stability.
Table 2 Satisfaction with democracy in various countries (%)
Very satisfied Satisfied Not very Dissatisfied
satisfied
Denmark 12.3 54.7 30.0 3.0
Portugal 10.1 66.5 20.2 3.2
Germany 10.0 65.4 19.7 4.9
Ireland 9.9 53.6 30.0 6.4
Austria 7.8 69.2 20.2 2.8
Greece 7.5 47.8 35.8 9.0
Spain 6.6 53.9 33.3 6.2
Netherlands 6.4 67.4 24.2 2.0
UK 5.5 48.2 35.0 11.3
France 4.4 45.0 39.3 11.3
Finland 4.0 52.6 39.2 4.3
Sweden 2.9 57.0 34.4 5.7
Belgium 2.4 46.9 35.0 15.7
Italy 1.6 34.3 52.7 11.4
EU countries
- average 6.5 54.5 32.1 6.9
Poland 2.0 43.2 41.6 13.1
Estonia 2.0 33.8 51.8 12.3
Hungary 1.8 29.6 56.2 12.5
Lithuania 1.6 23.9 52.5 22.0
Latvia 1.3 29.0 59.5 10.3
Slovenia 0.9 44.1 44.4 10.6
Slovakia 0.8 22.6 52.9 23.7
Czech Republic 0.7 36.5 49.7 13.0
Accession countries
- average 1.4 32.8 51.1 14.7
Croatia 2.2 14.7 58.4 24.6
Belarus 5.8 27.1 39.2 27.8
Turkey 3.1 20.7 25.7 50.6
Bulgaria 2.9 24.5 49.8 22.7
Romania 1.7 19.2 52.2 26.9
Ukraine 1.4 14.2 48.5 35.8
Russia 0.4 6.7 42.9 50.0
Countries outside
the EU- average 2.5 18.2 45.3 34.1
316
According to our results, there are significant differences in the
assessment of the state of democracy between the three groups of countries
(F = 3121.11, p<.001). Contrary to the "greater sensitivity"
assumption, the greatest satisfaction is displayed by the EU respondents.
Predictably, the least satisfied were respondents from non-EU
countries where the evasion of democratic procedures is most frequent
and most flagrant. Here, Croatia is closer to the non-EU average than
to the average score of accession countries. It should be emphasized
that Croatian data were collected in April 1999, eight months before the
general elections characterized by the widespread dissatisfaction with
the ruling party.
The next indicator, satisfaction with current government activities,
is shown in Figure 7. As in the previous case, all three groups of
countries differ significantly (F = 3064.62, p<.01). The level of satisfaction
is highest in the EU countries, and lowest in the non-EU countries.
Again, the average value for Croatia is lower than the mean value
of the accession countries. Of all the countries included in the analysis,
only in three countries (Lithuania, Russia and Turkey) the satisfaction
is lower than in Croatia.
Figure 7 Average satisfaction with government performance in different
countries (ten point scale)
317
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Netherlands
Germany
Portugal
Austria
Finland
Ireland
Spain
Great BritainSweden
Denmark
BelgiumGreeceFrance
Italy
EU countries Estonia
Slovenia
Latvia
Czech Republic
PolandHungary
SlovakiaLitvhuania
Accesion countries
Croatia
Bulgaria
Belarus
Romania
Ukraine
Russia
Turkey
Countries outside the EU
Summing up the findings of the analyses carried out so far, it
should be pointed out that in almost all the measured value dimensions
significant differences among the three groups of countries exist. The
differences co-exist with many overlaps, which are the consequence of
the important cultural, historical and political within-group differences
(Laitin, 2002).
Do our findings support an optimistic (Zielonka and Mair,
2002; Laitin, 2002) or a pessimistic (Fuchs and Klingemann, 2002;
Rohrschneider, 2002) view of the outcome of the future enlargement
of the EU? In our view, both positions are ideologically biased. The
methodology on which all the relevant studies have been based,
including ours, simply does not allow for a differentiation between
quantitative (difference in degree) from qualitative (incompatible)
differences.viii
Regarding post-materialism and social capital in Croatia, their
levels are most often similar to those of the accession countries, that is,
they differ considerably from the non-EU averages. But this does not
hold true for the assessment of democracy and the government. The
levels of satisfaction with the state of democracy and government activities
in Croatia are substantially lower than those in the accession countries.
To say that they are situational effects, a reflection of the widespread
dissatisfaction with the way the transition processes were managed
in the nineties, does not mean that they cannot have more lasting
consequences - especially if dissatisfaction with the government becomes
chronic. As Misler and Rose (1997:441) argue, an evaluation of the
government is closely related to trust and explains the greater percentage
of its variance than indicators of cultural inertia (socialist heritage).
RESULTS II: TRUST IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
In the second part of the paper we test trust in the EU, which we
consider crucial for the debate about the dynamics and consequences of
EU enlargement and the positioning of Croatia within this process. First
we present the differences in trust in the EU, and then proceed with an
interpretation based on an analysis of the factors affecting it.
The distribution of trust in the EU in the three groups of countries
shown in Figure 8 indicates differences between the EU and the
318
accession countries on the one hand, and the non-EU countries on the
other. Trust is highest in the member countries and then in the associate
countries. The difference between these two groups does not attain
statistical significance, but both differ from the non-EU countries
(F=75.95, p<.01). Trust in the EU is lowest in the countries outside the
EU. What is the situation in Croatia? The figures are encouraging. The
level of trust in the EU in Croatia is comparable to the average levels in
the EU countries and the accession countries.
Figure 8 Confidence in the European Union in different countries (%)
319
none at all not very much quite a lot a great deal
Italy
Ireland
SpainPortugal
BelgiumFrance
Austria
Great BritainGermany
Sweden
Greece
NetherlandsDenmark
Finland
EU countriesSlovakiaHungary
Poland
Czech Republic
Slovenia
LatviaEstoniaLithuania
Accession countriesCroatia
TurkeyBulgaria
Ukraine
Romania
BelarusRussia
Countries outside the EU
100
80
60
40
20
0
The fact that the more successful transitional countries show a
higher level of trust in the EU than the less successful seems to be based
on the belief of the citizens that integration is a guarantee for the continuation
of reforms which they view favourably. Using another database
(Central and Eastern European Eurobarometer), Tucker et all.,
(2002) show that this holds at the national level too, that is within each
individual transitional country. As their analyses show, successful
states (the winners) are characterized by greater trust in the EU than the
unsuccessful (the losers). Transitional specifics of the dynamics of trust
in the EU are emphasized in a research study (Alvarez, 2003) showing
that union membership is negatively correlated to the trust in the EU in
Western European countries, but is positively correlated to it in Eastern
European countries.
How can one explain the differences in trust in the EU? To identify
the factors affecting the trust, we included all the three explanatory
models (the post-materialist changes, social capital and situational reaction
models) in a regression equation, adding an additional indicator of
situational reaction (opportunism index) and the measure of economic
development (per capita GDP). The results of this multivariate analysis
are shown in Table 3. Although because of the size of the overall sample
(about 35,000 respondents) seven of the nine indicators reach the
level of statistical significance set in advance (p<.01), the most powerful
predictor of trust in the EU is trust in the national institutions. This
finding corroborates Andersons thesis (1998), according to which citizens,
when they do not have enough information about the EU, use an
evaluation of local (national) institutions and government as proxy. The
two indicators of situational reaction - satisfaction with democracy and
the government - are less strong correlates, but they clearly indicate the
impact of the post-communist transition on the way the EU is perceived.
Contrary to our expectations, the effect of the economic development
indicator (GDP) on trust in the EU is rather small. How should
this be interpreted? Setting aside the issue of how reliable an indicator
of the state of economy the GDP is, it is possible that GDP has an indirect,
rather than direct, influence expressed through non-economic or
exogenous variables.ix The analysis of the cross-correlations points to
the significant linkages between the degree of economic development
and socio-cultural indicators.x To test this hypothesis fully an application
of the modelling techniques will be required (Arminger and Clogg,
1995).xi
In a summary of the findings of the analysis of trust in the EU,
it is important to stress two things. Firstly, trust in the EU is significantly
greater in the set of successful transition countries. Countries still
searching a way out of the transition-caused recession and anomie are
markedly more distrustful of the EU. Secondly, our analysis indicates
that socio-cultural dimensions are important predictors of the trust.
Nevertheless, since a series of methodological restrictions rendered distinguishing
between economic and non-economic effects impossible,
320
the domination of the latter in the regression analysis should be taken
with caution.
Table 3 Correlates of trust in the European Union
b Beta
Generalised trust .05* .03*
Trust in institutions .62* .36*
Trust in norms (civility) .04* .03*
Association (social connectedness) .01 .02
Satisfaction with democracy .12* .11*
Satisfaction with government .03* .08*
Opportunism -.02* -.03*
Post-materialism .09* .06*
Per capita GDP (1999) .00* .06*
*p<.01; R2 =.18
Clearly, our results do not support Laitin's (2002:76) claim that
the problems of integration of new members of the EU if there will be
any at all will not be the consequences of cultural differences.xii
Without discarding the possibility of political frictions, which are at the
moment best described as the fear of the new members of being granted
a second rate status (Zielonka and Mair, 2002), socio-cultural differences
are real and under certain conditions could well be generators of conflict.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the previous sections we have attempted to answer two questions:
how far is Croatia, value-wise, from the EU, and what determines
trust in the EU? The answer to the first question is that in most of the
dimensions with an exception of satisfaction with the government
Croatia seems to be similar to the 10 accession countries. When trust in
the EU is considered, the crucial factor turned out to be the confidence
of the respondents in the institutions of their own societies. Anderson
(1998) offered an explanation of this finding: we make an assessment
of institutions we do not have enough information or experience about
according to an assessment of the work of comparable institutions
about which we do have information. In other words, respondents, particularly
those with lower levels of education, often judge transnational
institutions on the basis of their perception of national institutions.
321
Both our answers indicate the importance of measures that
would help increasing convergence in values with the EU. The point of
such measures, of course, is not just to facilitate and speed up Croatian
integration into the EU, but, primarily, to achieve a greater level of
social trust, economic success and political stability. Although it may
sound trivial, it should be emphasized that the desire for a value change
must not be motivated by political correctness, or the need to present
ourselves more favourably to those whose club we want to enter, but by
efforts to improve the Croatian reality. The authors of this paper do not
see the common EU Culture as a value in itself, rather something that
has a potential of making the everyday life in the members' societies
more pleasant and successful.
Six brief recommendations we present in conclusion are based
on the previous analyses, as well as on authors' earlier research (tulhofer,
2001; tulhofer and Rimac, 2002). Their ordering, we should
add, does not reflect their relative importance, nor does it rank the recommendations
according to implementation priority.
Fight against corruption. The objective is to halt the spread of
cynicism and opportunism, particularly among youth (tulhofer and
Rimac, 2002). In order to achieve this it is necessary to step up the work
of the existing institutions (particularly the recently established office
against corruption) and their presence in the media. Anti-corruption
campaign must be systematic, meaning that it should start in one sector,
and then move to others.
Improving the openness and independence of the media, as well
as their analytical scope and responsibility. The objective is to facilitate
a better understanding of social decisions and to improve, through
public awareness and pressure, the process by which they are made.
Higher quality media can help the growth of trust in institutions in two
ways: by increasing trust in ones own work, and by increasing the
quality of the political decision-making, which will result in an increase
in trust the citizens place in the government.
Increasing the effectiveness of the judiciary. The objectives are
to increase the trust of the citizens in institutions and particularly to
increase generalised trust. As is well known, generalised trust cannot
develop in a society in which it can be easily taken advantage of. If free
riders are not effectively sanctioned, trust and spirit of cooperation will
evaporate. At the moment, the duration of legal procedures in Croatia
is pushing social trust to the edge of irrationality.
Increasing public information about the EU. The objective is to
improve the quality of trust in the EU via better knowledge of its role
322
and activities, and greater use of its programmes and services. Although
according to the data of the Ministry for European Integration more
than 95% of citizens have heard of the EU, the knowledge of the
Croatian public about the activities, structure and procedures of the EU
is still very modest. The formal educational system in Croatia has to
assume a central role in providing systematic information about the EU.
Improving the educational level of the population. The objectives
are to increase value convergence and improve the capacity of the
public to obtain and understand relevant information (***, 2003a). In
order to accomplish this, a fundamental reform of the educational system,
at all levels, is necessary. Bearing in mind that Croatia is laggi