First published 2016
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Haldén, Peter, editor of compilation. | Jackson, Peter, 1971– editor of compilation.
Title: Transforming warriors : the ritual organization of military force / edited by Peter Haldén and Peter Jackson.
Other titles: Ritual organization of military force
Description: New York, NY : Routledge, [2016] | Series: Cass military studies | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2015048239| ISBN 9781138642836 (hardback) | ISBN 9781315629711 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Military socialization. | Soldiers–Psychology. | Soldiers–Training of–History. | Sociology, Military–History. | Military life. | War. | Ritual. | War–Religious aspects.
Classification: LCC U21.5 .T68 2016 | DDC 306.2/7–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2015048239

ISBN: 978-1-138-64283-6 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-62971-1 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman
by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

MIX
Paper from responsible sources
FSC® C013056

Printed and bound in Great Britain by
TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall

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From knights to officers in the Renaissance

Gorm Harste

Introduction

Since Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* (1957) and Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier* (1960), military sociology has unanimously maintained certain narratives about the basic constitutive elements of the professional officer. The stories hinge upon the establishment of formal education at places like West Point, Saint-Cyr, Sandhurst, and other defence academies. These narratives are part of the classic tale of the founding of the modern social order of industrial society and the establishment of bureaucracies in Max Weber's sense. They are almost part of what Hegel described as a 'second nature'. In his time, this 'social nature' began to include Gerhard von Scharnhorst and Carl von Clausewitz's military academy in Berlin, which was then situated in Prussia. In Huntington's narrative the Prussian academy laid the foundations for modern professionalized military departments that developed as parts of a departmentalized state with a separation of powers, but still with checks and balances. The development of a military order is, of course, much older and just one estate among many other estates, so to speak. However, military order is one thing, quite another is an organized body that is professionalized in line with other professions such as civil servants, judges, and the clergy. These four orders developed centuries before the classical Prussian state. The emergence of this early modern professionalized military order of officers is the concern of this chapter. In particular, it focuses on the conception of French military organization in the 1580s.

In the first section, I describe the hybrid form of political organization in Western Europe that was fundamentally disrupted by the Renaissance. In the next section, I consider why the French early military *compagnies d'ordonnance* initiated the professionalization of military officers. In a third section, I briefly describe the context of the more generalized transformations in professional corporate spirit during the Renaissance. The fourth section analyses the linkage between the transformation of civil servants described by Jean Bodin's sociology of law and organization from 1576. The fifth section analyses Francois de la Noue's description of the new form of military academies and professionalized officer from 1589 onwards. Both scholars proposed the new abstractions, formalizations, and professionalizations as solutions to the French Wars of Religion.

Preconditions of the Renaissance revolution in professionalization

During the Renaissance, which lasted from the mid fifteenth century until the early seventeenth century, an abstraction process took place in the formation of power. 'Power' was conceptualized as two interdependent aspects: 1) the capacity to get things done; and 2) the need to handle other people in order to do so. Knowing when synchronization of matters and people needed to take place linked the two. Power, in French, is a verb which implies 'doing' and 'pouvoir' expresses the idea that power is a relation between two or more parties, necessary for the 'doing' to take place. Hence, when we say that power 'empowers' we refer to the self-referentiality (Luhmann 1997: 64ff.) implied in 'pouvoir'. In German we may say 'Macht mach Macht', in other words, power empowers power. Since the High Middle Ages, power has been authorized to handle networks and therefore to coordinate and synchronize, to include some and exclude others. These operations were theologically authorized and institutionalized in the body politic, the *corpus spiritus*, of the Church. The Holy Spirit synchronized communication, making distance no object, thereby empowering the Church to be in power to handle itself. In this way, almighty 'might' combined eternal authority and temporal might into an idealized form of unified absolute power. With the legal revolution of the twelfth century, this new shape began to form semantics of rules and derogation of rules (Harste 2013).

Without doubt, such discussions constitute organizational problems in the modern world to a considerable extent. Modern analyses of teamwork, human resource management, networking, organizational culture, strategic management, and professionalization seldom contribute ideas that had not already been discussed during the five centuries between the formation of the organizational pattern in the High Middle Ages and the late Renaissance. The organizational models were often painted on the walls of monasteries or the walls of city halls. They depicted, almost invariably, variations of the Last Supper, on the one hand along very formal lines with little difference between the way each disciple is shown and, on the other hand, along far more fluid lines with the disciples depicted as having more conflictual and individual positions. These paintings invoke the story told in this article: the break-up and dissolution of the integrated form of *corpus spritus* used in Catholic diplomacy and conflict resolution which was followed by escalations in the early modern wars of religion (Elwood 1999; Gisey 1999).

Amazingly, the most famous depictions of the Last Supper, the paintings of Leonardo da Vinci (1495) and Veronese (1573), suggested the organizational form of the future – the central perspective – which was (re)formulated in Max Weber's model of bureaucracy. What was the new form of membership about and how did this concern the military forces that empowered and depicted the new form of organization and rule? What kind of power was possible once such an abstraction of professional membership from the personal rule was coded, accepted, and brought into use? These are the questions to be answered in this chapter and they will be addressed through an analysis of the professionalization

of both ordinary soldiers and officers too. The investigations involve a range of historical material as well as methodological and theoretical approaches from historical sociology, military history, and social theory. The problem is about the leadership of soldiers, not only in war, but also in the preparation for and in the aftermath of wars. It is about a form of conduct which the Roman military called 'dux', from *ducere*, to lead.

The key to the present analysis can be taken from Niklas Luhmann:

> The political complexity that is attained can best be understood if, for the purpose of historical comparison, the theory of the 'reasons of state' ... is considered. By the year 1600 the idea of 'state government' was already detectable. But the organization of the state and the holding of offices (especially the holding of leading offices by a prince) were not clearly distinguished in the concept of the state. Therefore, 'reasons of state' was justified by the necessity of government itself. In other words, the concepts of domination and state were not yet separated, so that one could still say, *'L'état c'est moi'*. The code functions of leading offices – the fact that their occupation by one person excluded another – were not yet differentiated from the program function, i.e. not distinguished from the question of by whom and according to which programs the government should execute its task.
>
> (Luhmann 1989a: 86–7)

In particular, Chris Thornhill (2011: 65–72) has focused on the systematic constitutionalization of modern society as being based on this abstracted form of power. Yet, in his seminal studies, he has mainly focused on legal and political developments, whereas I will focus on the organizational and military developments, in particular the increasing popularity of codes with the self-codifications of 'organizational' and 'military' (Luhmann 1997: 565; Harste 2013). Apart from classical studies by Durkheim and Weber, only a small number of modern studies, by Michel Foucault and Niklas Luhmann for example, have exposed the pastoral power and the early learning processes of the corporate spirit and the development of its corresponding models of inclusion, exclusion, and membership (Durkheim 1930; Kantorowicz 1957; Luhmann 1977; Rossum and Böckenförde 1978; Weber 1980; Elwood 1999; Foucault 2004).

Semantics, codes, membership, and professionalization, however, do not stay unaltered and untransformed throughout centuries; they have to re-adapt to new circumstances and new structural couplings between the societal functional and organizational systems that in turn become increasingly complex in the way that they differ, but are also mutually interdependent. Studying the Renaissance transformation confronts the scholar with the difficulties of understanding both unclear distinctions and the networks of family names; yet, reading the old texts, the point is to find the distinctions that make a difference. To put it another way: evolution takes place with the peculiar invention of involution that makes innovation visible and meaningful. This was what the Renaissance was about (Luhmann 1980; 1997: 536ff., 678–87). The Renaissance revolution has been

studied from many different angles. The present study concerns how the meso- and micro-levels of organizational and professional transformations were structurally coupled with developments in the war system and established the beginnings of a military organizational system.

The disruption in the early Renaissance

For Norbert Elias (1976), Georges Duby (1978), and Jean Flori (2001), to become a knight was to be the chosen servant of God. He was to be an incarnation of the disciples, which meant that he had to be disciplined. According to Duby, this was unlikely to happen since it would be rare to find adults who would be comfortable with the situation of being mounted on a horse, burdened with 70 kilos of armour and able to attack adversaries who would be similarly equipped, even thought their nature as children might have marked them out as being suitable warrior material when they reached adulthood. Yet, an equally overwhelming burden of semantics and codes about honour, courage, shame, pride, and guilt transformed such a possibility into reality through the means of training and communion with the Holy Spirit (de Charny 1873).

Philip Gorski (2003) has coined the term "disciplinary revolution" to describe the effect of the Calvinist transformation of discipline that was developed in Dutch military academies and which was part of more far-reaching reforms applied to commercial life, urbanization, and education. To the noble life of a knight, we should also add a requirement for ascetic discipline. Hence, we find many insights in Weber's (1980) study about the transition from patrimonial social orders to early modernity. This includes a number of vocational codes that link Protestant ethics with the early spirit of bureaucracy, capitalism, urbanity, and a sense of 'time is money'.

In the latter part of the fifteenth century, the printing press revolutionized communication. Now communication could turn itself inwards and, as Luhmann (1997: 291–301) has put it, communicate about communication. Before the Reformation and the widespread exploration that accelerated the discovery of new worlds, it became possible to write, for example, an instruction manual about the extremely difficult process of transforming iron into cannons, at the same time as books and the laws of the land too, could be published in large numbers. From the days of the monks writing illuminated manuscripts things had been written down by hand. Now, with the advent of the printing press, books containing standardized information could be printed so that the same text and the same instructions were available to all; processes could be carried out in the same way by anybody reading a particular book. (Black 1991: 10).

The transformation of the knightly order of warriors began with the so-called *compagnies d'ordonnance* of the French king, Charles VII. Between 1445–1446 he instigated a permanent group of 15 captains who each commanded about 600 men. Each 600 was composed of about 100 knights, 200 archers, 100 logistical *coutiliers*, 100 valets, and 100 young pages (Contamine 1992a: 201–8). Such a very expensive combined complex order was in need of a new form of semantics,

new symbols, and new forms of political thought. This new fighting force was an outstanding novelty in the competition between the European dynasties and it was certainly comparable to a military revolution of society and politics, and signalled advances in early modern state formation. Over the next few decades, France emerged as a superpower on another scale altogether, since the permanent troops soon acquired particular skills and could conduct campaigns that demolished the dynastic state of Burgundy and secured the peripheral regions of France existing at the brink of the royal domains, the so-called *pays d'élections* (Contamine 1992b; Potter 1995: 110ff.). These regions were called the *pays d'états* and the idea of estates constituting a monarchical republic (*res publica*) became crucial to the state semantics of the *raison d'état*. The concept *état*, in fact, originated as a hybrid description, the 'status' of the staff and the 'estate' on which the livelihoods of the king's staff, his court and especially his family depended. In 1495, for example, King Louis XI had a staff of 365; a few decades later Francois I had a staff of over 600, and in 1560 Henri II had a staff of 1,049. This development certainly marked a transformation from the patrimonial dynasties with their feudal *ban* and *arrière ban* used to associate knights and commoners under heraldic orders and dynastic flags respectively. The armies were no longer simply self-financing troops supplemented with some financial contributions from provincial estates.

The French monarchy campaigned abroad on the Italian peninsula from 1492 onwards. According to several scholars, this series of wars enforced the military competition as a still ongoing evolutionary and revolutionary endeavour (Porter 1994; Knox and Williamson 2001). Hereby, the role of knights was profoundly transformed and eventually constituted at a very different level of power abstraction and institutionalization. The military organization system merged with an amazingly new form a couple of generations later.

The debate

The transformation was indeed indebted to new semantics and communication codes about inclusion of warriors into membership of a new elite and its *esprit de corps*. According to a romantic description used by Norbert Elias, a knight was forced to kneel in a particular ceremony which, once undergone, gave admittance to an exclusive group at court. Another and more widely discussed analysis, sustained by Arlette Jouanna (1989; 1991; 1996; 2013) and Robert Descimon (2000), describes a much more organizational transformation of inclusion and exclusion. This points towards an organizational modernity that was the classical position of Max Weber – his definitions of state and bureaucracy, for example – yet these authors also challenge the 'official' French narrative of a simple top-down administrative revolution, inherited from Alexis de Tocqueville (1988) and continued by Roland Mousnier (1971; 1974; 1980), which seems a bit too 'Machiavellistic'.

More recently, Niklas Luhmann (1980; 1981; 1989b; 1995; 1997: 678–743) has defended the "take-off" of modernity as commencing with the professionalization

of membership in the *grand corps d'état*, whereas Pierre Bourdieu (1994: 97–131; 2004; 2012) defends a position of it being later than this, as if the ancient regime continued to dominate. An important part of this discussion of the organizational form of the early modern state concerns the form, codes, and semantics about professions. A historical sociology should cope with a sociology of professions, i.e. questioning the when, where, how, when considering semantics, communication codes, and codes about codes (Harste 2013). The modernization thesis is particularly concerned about such transformations.

The legal profession has been analysed by Françoise Autrand (1981) and François Bluche (1986). Transformations in the semantics, codes, and forms of the military profession, however, have not been the subject of much study since Jean-Antoine Guibert and Carl von Clausewitz, and any studies that do exist have then only been positioned in between those concerned with codes of chivalry and those concerned with modern professionalization. This is probably due to the deplorable fact that war studies seem to have been neglected by social theory. Social theory has mainly focused on domestic social order and has largely forgotten concerns about the conflicts that can exist in transformations that concern relations abroad, such as the construction of military organizations. As has happened with military revolutions, there are a number of transformations that have taken place in the professionalization of military organizational systems.

Some, like Victor Hanson (2007), may stick to the simultaneous logocentric and hoplite revolutions in Greek early antiquity and advance views on the corporate spirit of the hoplite. At the other end of the scale, Jeremy Black pleas for a professionalization that arrived with Frederick the Great, Guibert, and Napoleon Bonaparte in the late Enlightenment. They are both right but Luhmann's analysis of the abstraction process with regard to inclusion/membership focuses the "take-off" (Luhmann 1997: 565) on the self-description in the organizational systems. This narrows the 'take-off' that we are searching for to what Barnard Barbiche (1987) calls the "organizational revolution", and in particular the codes of military professions that conditions such a revolution.

The focus is delimited in the search for transformations taking place between the time at which Niccolò Machiavelli's *Dell'Arte della Guerra* (Machiavelli 1991) as well as, more famously, his *Il Principe* (Machiavelli 1962) were written, and the time Frederick the Great (1738) wrote *Anti-Machiavel*. Anti-Machiavellism was the name for the extreme endeavour to find social, legal, political, and organizational communication codes beyond those of cynicism. These efforts were less about the Machiavellian opportunistic and unethical ways of manipulating people, but about the social might of enabling synchronization and disciplined coordination inside a framework of loyalty that was no longer indebted to a Catholic semantic of a common *corpus spiritus*. Still, these thinkers did not simply wish to replace Machiavellianism with a secular form of *esprit de corps* or military corporate spirit. This theme, and its paradoxes, is a classic topic in military sociology (Huntington 1957; du Picq 2005; Ouellet 2005; King 2007).

Barbiche (1987) calls our attention to the separation of legal power from organizational power that took place at the end of the sixteenth century. With Luhmann's systems theory we may observe how codes of organization begin to code organization in Jean Bodin's famous *Six Books of the Republic* from 1576. This text owes its reputation to its description of the perpetual sovereignty of the monarchy. Indeed, it launched a revolution in its description of magistrates in their positions as commissioned officers with perpetual tasks: The officer was modelled according to the idea of Jesus who became conceptualized as an eternal Christ (Kantorowicz 1957; Luhmann 1977: 273ff.). Just like the king had two bodies, as temporal Jesus and eternal Christ, his officers would also have two bodies. Bodin's analysis was meant to ascribe new functions to the monarch, his estate, and the hierarchical estate society in which this new form of the monarchial estate should place itself as the highest estate. The distinction between temporal commission and eternal office was kept until later. "An officer is the public person who has an ordinary charge defined by law. The holder of a commission is the public person who has an extraordinary charge defined in the terms of the commission" (Bodin 2014: 81). In the Roman military, this concept of permanency had some significance, but it remained a minor point and continued to be a problem for the stabilization of Roman administration. The concept is, in fact, a very Christian invention by the Western Catholic Church, which became very different from the still clientilist Orthodox Byzantine Church that later heavily influenced Russian clientilism from the Tsarist regime to Stalin and, much later, Putin (cf. Thornhill 2011: 327ff.). Yet, it became decisive for those descriptions of military officers in an environment where Huguenot thinking prevailed. This advocated Bodin's re-constitution of the monarchy to encompass Huguenot assistance due to the fact that Henri IV's (King of Navarre from 1572 and King of France from 1594) military chief of staff was the moderate Huguenot François de la Noue, who published his *Discours Politiques et Militaires* in 1587.

In a first attempt, we could depict the social forms discussed so far in Figure 5.1, which includes a few interpretations of the form of power invested.

Jean Bodin's reconstruction of the officer and the commissionaire

From the late fifteenth century onwards, the king's staff in France was the largest among European monarchies. On the basis of the staff estate, its functions, its salaries, and its positions, Roland Mousnier was able to write an account of the weight of the dynastic administration as it was maintained and delegated. We should not use today's ideas of centralization and decentralization, although such ideas could be observed from a more central perspective. The officers were nominated and patrimonialized into positions; they were not employed in the later sense of delimited employment. They did not have a certain job or an office as a place for working on tasks. Neither did they have delimited budgets, or an administratively recognized education. Yet, nevertheless, Mousnier found a total



Figure 5.1 Separation of forms of power.

of between 7,000–8,000 nominated officials for the year 1515 when Francis I came into power. The reign of Francis I marks a turning point in the symbolization of government: He symbolically authorized rule but questioned quite a number of the rituals and symbols hitherto monopolized by the Church. It was a time when all kinds of symbols and concepts were "essentially contested" (Connolly 1983). It is important to remember that these were the years when the writings of Seyssel, Machiavelli, Erasmus, Luther, and Calvin were written and published. The New World was detected. The old world with its symbols, concepts, organizations, and social orders had come adrift (Wilentz 1999). Amazing new powerful symbols began to appear, such as statues of Justitia, who represented a hybrid form between a half-naked innocent virgin (Mary), a warrior with a sword, and a balance between virtues and vices. Religion, the military, and justice were about to find new forms – in public places (Robert 1993). The hybrid statues of Justitia indeed expressed this highly contested debate about concepts.

In 1560, about 25,000 state administrative positions were in place and in 1660 about 46,000. These were not simply nominated any more, but were occupied by employed personnel. Employed persons did not figure much before the 1730s, however, at which time more than 125,000 such jobs existed. Yet, French society was not richer or bigger in 1730 than it was in 1515, but it carried and used the weight of the state in a different way. This difference is explained by the military organization and its costs.

Yet, although he certainly belonged to the group of anti-Machiavellians, due to his position close to the moderate so-called 'politiques', Bodin attacked decentralists such as Calvinist Guillaume Budé and his *l'Institution de Prince* and the monarchists Hotman and Béze as "dangerous people". They all favoured the freedom of the decentralized estates and sovereign courts (Hotman), and the free corps of the king's officers (Béze). Bodin was certainly influenced by his young contemporary Étienne de Boétie's *Discours de la Servitude Volontaire* from 1548 (see Jouanna 2013: 100–2, 111–12). Will, even the king's will, always has to be defended in a reasonable way, i.e. in an institutionalized form, as Bodin had claimed already in his *Methôde de l'Histoire* (1951: 405–6). It would be wrong, however, to see the completely opposite position to the decentralists in Bodin's theory of state and politics. Rather, he aims towards some kind of unity in complexity. This unified complexity can be observed in the following description:

> It follows that there are two sorts of public persons with a right to command. One is the sovereign right which is absolute, unlimited, and above the law, the magistrates and all citizens. The other is the legal right, subject to the laws and the sovereign. This is proper to the magistrate, and those who have extraordinary powers conferred on them by commission. These persons can exercise the right only until their office is revoked or their commission expired. The prince after God recognizes no superior whatsoever. The magistrate, under God, holds his powers of the prince and exercises them subject to the prince and the laws. The citizen, under God, is each according to his degree subject to the prince, his laws, and his magistrates, each in his proper sphere. I should add that I comprehend under the name of magistrate all those who have rights of jurisdiction annexed to their fiefs, for these rights they hold of the prince just as does any other magistrate. Only sovereign princes have an absolute right to command, in the sense that they alone can use the phrase "I ordain that..." The will of the magistrate, and of all others who have power to command is subject to the will of the sovereign, to which they are strictly bound, for he can revise, amend, or revoke his orders at will. Therefore the magistrates can never, either individually or collectively use the phrases "for such is our good pleasure", or "on pain of death" in the commissions they issue. Only the sovereign can do this in his ordinances. This raises an important question which has never been properly determined, and that is whether the power of the sword is peculiar to the prince and inseparable from his sovereignty, so that the magistrate has only the right of execution of high justice, or whether such power is proper to the magistrate because communicated to him by the prince.
>
> (Bodin 1961: 431–2; 2014: 92–3)

We see that Bodin distinguishes between the prince, the magistrates, and the particular subjects. In fact *Les Six Livres de la République* contains one book on the sovereign (book I), one book on the magistrates (book III) and one book on the different combinations of government and state (book II). My point is that the strength of Bodin's famous definition, "Sovereignty is that absolute and perpetual power vested in a commonwealth" (Bodin 1961: 409; 2014: 85),[1] lies less in the old idea of *potestas absoluta* as in the idea of permanency, *and* that the meaning of permanence is shown in a theory of permanent magistrates whether 'officers' or 'commissars'. The lawgiver is sovereign because he can refer to two kinds of magistrates, those who judge for him, the 'officers' and those who command him, the 'commissars' As far as de la Noue is concerned, we will see why the idea of permanent command was so important in order to conceptualize a permanent military organization. Thus, the sovereign presents what Bodin calls "the state" as a unified state, and he can govern because his government is executed. Bodin in fact elaborates an early idea of the bureaucracy needed by the sovereign:

> After the sovereign, the magistrate is the chief personage in the commonwealth, for upon him the sovereign devolves his authority and his power of commanding obedience. We must therefore consider what obedience is due from the magistrate to the prince, since this is his first duty. Unlike the sovereign who knows no superior, but sees all his subjects obedient to his power, or the private citizen who has no official right to use compulsion against anyone, the magistrate is many personages of different quality, bearing, appearance, and mode of action in one.
>
> (Bodin 1961: 409)

Now, why should the magistrates obey? Are they not just networks of more or less trustworthy (*fidèle*) persons, more or less loyal? Bodin's point is that they do not only have to obey the laws, they are also suppressed according to a natural divine law. Why do they want anything to do with a natural divine law? Because they thereby get a completely new status as perpetual parts of the monarchical estate. Here, Bodin uses a current distinction between juridical ordinary officers and commanding commissars, the latter being extraordinary appointed "king's men" (Bodin 2014: 56–9).[2] Hitherto, the tenure of the commission ended when the commissioning sovereign died; now Bodin reverses the argument: the commission stays valid until it is changed.

In book 4, chapter 4, however, Bodin attacks permanency as a kind of *substantial* everlasting delegated condition; the position is not a patrimonial part of someone's body, but a delegated part of the body of the prince. The point is that it should not be the commissioned employee or the officer in charge who himself keeps the permanent power; the perpetual moment is only what the lawgiver delegates to the office or the commission. Yet, the commission stays as a charge because of the institution of the king's *corps et college*. Thus, Bodin transforms the administration into a "system", an abstract body, desubstantialized, but with another form of reality. As such, the administration realizes what the king is by natural law, rather than what the substantive members of the administrative bodies are by way of their own particular history.

The possibility of this abstraction from bodily substance is exactly what the quarrel about the Reformation was about (Jouanna 1996: 306; Elwood 1999).

This small transformation of a detailed legal argument seems to be the turning point for the sovereign monarchy. It is important to note that the scope and number of commissars were increasing dramatically during the years of intensified military revolution. Later on, after the formalization of the Code Michaud's 461 articles in 1629, the use of commissions "operated in a way as a revolution" (Mousnier 1980, vol. II: 493). These commissars were later to be known as the famous 'intendants' whose power, according to Tocqueville's somewhat exaggerated analysis, gave rise to an opposition of such strength that it became the French Revolution.

According to Bodin, the magistrates are to be differentiated by a number of classifications. First, we have the legal status of their *temporal* perpetual position: judges are ordinary and commissars extraordinary, especially in the case of war. Second, Bodin observes an original Justinian classification according to qualities (*qualitées*): there are those who are "the well educated, the representable, the honourable, and the perfect" ("*les illustre, les spectables, les clarissimes (les digne), et perfectissimes*"). (Bodin 1961: 395). Third, Bodin observes a rather large scope of different *tasks* (*mandements*), which in his classification are still not as specialized as August Dorwart's (1953) later description of the Prussian departmentalization of administrative sections (from the reforms in 1722). In remembering that before the late Enlightenment most chancellors divided the work according to a simple distinction between incoming and outgoing letters, Bodin's classification is quite differentiated according to functional needs:

> For the prince issues orders of various sorts. There are general and perpetual edicts, binding on all sorts and conditions of his subjects whatsoever; or there are laws relating to certain persons, or certain circumstances, by way of provision; there are grants of exemption in favour of a single person, or a small group of such; or there are grants of privilege which do not involve any suspension of the law; there are grants of offices and commissions; there are the orders that declare war, publish peace, raise the army, or equip a fleet; there are levies of taxes, aids, subsidies, new imposts, and loans; there are the despatches issued to ambassadors instructing them to felicitate or condole with foreign princes, and treaties of marriages, alliances, and such like matters; there are letters of execution for the expediting of justice, the restitution of minors, the remission of sentences, or pardon of offences and such like matters.
>
> (Bodin 1961: 410)

A fourth and final classification is hierarchical and comprises Bodin's chapters on the different levels of magistrate: First of all, of course, there is the relation between the king and the magistrates, then the relation between higher and lower magistrates and, finally, the relation between magistrates and the subjects of governance. These are what Bodin calls distinctions in *gouvernement*. However, his distinction between *état* and *gouvernement* is rather the opposite of the one currently in use. *État* is still used as the political state, i.e. the monarchical 'estate'. The sovereignty of the 'estate' might be monarchical, tyrannical, aristocratic, or popular. Yet the word 'state' is in full transformation (Luhmann 1989b: 65–148; Koselleck *et al.* 1990: 9–18, 99–110). Government as 'administration' is still in use; however, it is rather now taken to mean the link between politics and administration. Moreover, 'state' today rather refers to the unity of a departmentally differentiated administration. In the concluding last chapter of Bodin's *Les Six Livres de la République*, the distinction *état/gouvernement* is used to reduce the complexity of the different forms of estates and their relation to governmental complexity. The king, of course, needed his employees (Spitz 1998: 86–103). He could not, as Hobbes falsely thought, have instrumental power over employed magistrates. According to what principles should they then obey the law?

My point is that this is a definite administrative problem that arose time and time again with the new commissars and the huge numbers of recently employed persons, usually not from the nobility. As long as the government relied on noble persons, who were thought to have virtue and honour, their acts were somehow sanctioned by their families, reputation, and ambitions. During the first half of the sixteenth century, large groups of people were surprisingly upwardly mobile (Jouanna 1991) due to a lack of regulations to hinder advancement, and the criteria used for their appointments were subject to intense discussion (Jouanna 1989). Had these people simply possessed traditional so-called 'ordinary' positions in the juridical corps, then their status would have been institutionalized and guaranteed. In particular, this included military officers who were not mercenaries, knights, or common soldiers, but who were a new kind of personnel with specializations, including experiences as private *condottieri*, but still part of the military estate of the monarchy.

François de la Noue and the professionalization of officers

When de la Noue was captured and imprisoned in the castle of Limburg in 1580, the French Wars of Religion had already disrupted political rule for about two decades. Under such circumstances, it is somewhat peculiar that people such as Bodin and de la Noue had the time and could make the effort to write such seminal books as *Les Six Livres de la République* and *Discours Politiques et Militaires*. First, however, we should not forget that from very beginning the conflict was about intellectual theological matters: the question of the form of retained or delegated power according to the model of the substantial Catholic or symbolic Calvinist model of the Eucharist (Calvin 1541; Elwood 1999). In today's language, we can say that the conflict was about the management concept of society: how centralized or decentralized should society be? Furthermore, the printed versions of the Bible, including the many interpretations, were in favour of the decentralized model certainly already in existence. Hence, Bodin's solution was to propose a compromise: a new version, written from the

point of view of the middle ground and which allowed for a combination of the two, in a real Hegelian upheaval. This, by virtue of its description, favoured a less strong Catholic stance.

Yet what would be the form of the military under such circumstances? This was de la Noue's real problem. It was not enough any more to rely on the traditional model of some kind of loose gathering of noble knights governing *condottieres* in the Italian way each with groups of mercenaries recruited from the lower levels of society. There were Catholic interpretations with regard to the same matter, however, such as the Savoyard adviser Réné de Lucinge's *De la Naissance, Durée et Chute des Estats* (1984). As de la Noue did, de Lucinge also proposed a military campaign against the Turks in order to reconcile the Catholic and Protestant adversaries. Whereas Lucinge proposed a small expeditionary force, de la Noue imagined a major campaign to include all Christian princes, with the aim of eventually reinstating Orthodox Byzantine rule. The last 200 pages of de la Noue's publication are concerned with this issue. He probably saw a major role for himself in such endeavours.

De la Noue used the first chapters to complain about the bad manners among young persons who became uncivilized through the civil wars. According to him, war destroys moderation in thought, mind, spirit, and body and classical social virtues such as honour, dignity, and respect are eradicated too. Hence, the classic notion of *esprit de corps*, as a social and political notion, should be differentiated and integrated into a new form. Discipline in spirit and discipline in body are both necessities if conflicts have to be subject to any kind of consensual moderation. Conflicts should become encapsulated instead of dispersed into disintegrated centrifugal forms of destruction.

De la Noue's first depiction of a new form was the founding of military academies, namely those whose specialization is the training of mounted soldiers. In German the concept is well known as *Ritterakademien* (Conrads 1982). This might at first sight seem to be a rather old-fashioned idea. In his first *Discours*, chapter 5, he uses Plutarch to introduce the idea, and it seems to be a proposal for a sports school where the likes of horseriding, vaulting, fencing etc. would be taught. In addition, the disciples should have discipline and disciplines such as geography, mathematics, writing, music and art, as well as lessons in social etiquette were suggested. The points to note are: first, about the repeated exercises and training programmes; second, about the notion of salaried teachers, invited over from Italy for three years who would develop teaching students who eventually would become teachers. The educating of teachers, learning to learn and teaching others about the best way of learning appeared to be the idea of creating a new corps with a "profession" of its own (de la Noue's term). Students would enter the school at age 18–19 and stay for 4–5 years.

However, the debate was not only about centralization/decentralization. Just as important was the conflict between Machiavellism and anti-Machiavellism. De la Noue enters into that conflict zone in the following chapters. On the one hand, he recognizes Machiavelli's form of argumentation depicted in *The Prince* and in *The Discourses*, but de la Noue was certainly better acquainted with

Machiavelli's *The Art of War*. De la Noue aimed to reinforce the critique, already exposed in 1571 by Innocent Gentillet, in a publication soon known as *Anti-Machiavel* (original: *Discours sur les Moyen de Bien Gouverner*). Once again, the problem is the instrumentalization of conflict, hatred, and aggression to which youth became socialized. Machiavelli accepted the existence of violence at the same time as he favoured the militia model. Hence, soldiers and their violence were not moderated from the inside of organized armies, but only through their civilian backgrounds. Throughout the sixteenth century, however, it became more and more obvious that wars socialized young soldiers in a secondary way and instilled in them a form of manners different to the one they had learned from family life. Since the works of du Picq and Émile Durkheim, army life has created today what we would describe as 'secondary socialization'. Hence, in modern and future armies where firearms would be the rule and not the exception, this kind of instrumentalization of fighting had to be subject to learning and to professionalization. The new officers had to be encouraged not to develop crude cynicism – the problem being how to moderate and discipline cynicism and how to teach good judgement in its use. The military academies were all about teaching the young disciples to judge and, eventually, to aim and fire. This was celebrated as the new form of power, crystallized in the aforementioned statue of Justitia, the hybrid of a virgin and an armed soldier. If it is impossible to love your enemy, then at least be aware of what love and compassion is so that you can respect him. This is an obligatory virtue. Unfortunately, however, aggressive young people more often used injurious and/or bad words. If any form of decentralized army was to be acceptable, it had to be combined with a highly scholarly and disciplined form of behaviour.

Social forms of cynicism, in one form of Machiavellism or another, became widespread during the Thirty Years' War, in the colonial wars, and again from 1914–2014, and cruelty in armies developed to unprecedented levels. The answer was to let elites escape from an irresponsible and shallow life, and to teach them more of what, in the sixteenth century, was intensively discussed as 'competencies'. Quite amazingly for our modern mind, intellectual figures such as Bodin and de la Noue really thought that the devil was around, in the form of

Table 5.1 Scheme of François de la Noue's forms of army

	Decentralized organizational form of army	*Centralized form of army*
Cynicism, instrumental behaviour	Neo-Machiavellian cruelty, uncontrolled and un-disciplined aggression, hatred	Absolute tyranny
Disciplined behaviour	Modern (Protestant or Catholic) *professional* officers in modern armies: socialization to moderation, respect, virtues	Ancient Catholic form of virtues (small armies) *or* a new Bodinian form of rule (of legal power)

witches, for instance. Bodin even wrote an entire book on witches and de la Noue refers to accounts about 30,000 witches in France (de la Noue 1967: 26). A notion regarding cruelty, other than that which pertained to superstition, is that it was seen as something inherent in human beings – a sin and a simple desire, even desire for revenge. According to Jean Calvin, only a few people were chosen to be human beings without an innate wicked side, and it was not known who would, in fact, be chosen to be clean and pure. Diabolic cynicism was, therefore, surely inherently dangerous in armies and in the hands of soldiers; it had to be controlled. When we remember it was a mindset common for most people before Descartes – magic (black or white), mysteries, miracles, and wonders were around and could be subject to abuse – then Bodin and de la Noue are not so irrational, because their aim was to establish some kind of rational form in a social life that was vulnerable and which could easily fall apart when violence erupted. During the French Wars of Religion, cruelty was certainly practised among the adversaries of faith: the enemy was dehumanized, and massacres, rape and torture began to occur in increasing numbers. Pure violence happened more and more often. During the St Bartholomew's Day massacre in 1572, for example, about 20,000 Huguenots were killed.

De la Noue insists on some kind of good judgement. The economic costs of wars should, therefore, be an important part of judging the need for war. Amazingly, this was indeed an important consideration of wars between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, all the way up until Kant, who considered taxes and credits as important parts of the interpretation of war costs (Kant 1977). De la Noue, in *Discours VIII*, mainly considers the costs of 35 years of civil war in France. Furthermore, as an important analysis, he considers if nobles used to living in luxury and affluence can accept such costs. As later discussed by Clausewitz, the economic and moral costs are mainly due to the protracted nature of such wars and the exhaustion at their continuance felt by citizens. They disrupt virtues and the capacity to reproduce. Noble elites who are responsible for wars should consider as a rule of thumb that one year of war costs two years of reparation of production capacities. Due to such considerations, de la Noue argues that a noble life of chivalry as a warrior or knight is over. Such a life he describes with a Spanish poem that is well known among French warriors:

> The war is my fatherland
> My harness is my house:
> And in every season
> To fight, that is my life
>
> (de la Noue 1967: 211)

The "perpetual warriors", in fact, lose their love for their fatherland and the sentiments they may have with regard to being good citizens (de la Noue 1967: 212). Amazingly, French nobles learned about new architecture and new, more civilized virtues during the Italian Wars (1492–1525); they learned about luxury, and there is no doubt that we can observe a radical transformation in architecture among the French nobility in the sixteenth century. The nobles acquired a taste for peaceful living:

> Those people, who in their estate only can live attached to war to such a degree that they also make it their profession, they err immensely; and they ignore or want to ignore that man is principally made for peace and tranquillity, and thereby to live a more just life.
>
> (de la Noue 1967: 210)

The dilemma imposed with regard to the codes of honour among the knightly ranks was surely a question of life and death. In no period were duels so much in use as in France before the military way of organized life began to take over. Fighting was about conflicts in the face-to-face interaction system and did not yet take place between state organizations: about 8,000 French nobles lost their lives in duels in the ten years between 1598 and 1608 (Corvisier 1992: 332). Honour and nobility had to be preserved in a sword fight that took place to prove 'justice' or 'satisfaction', i.e. it re-established justice and honour. Furthermore, nobles saw the idea of working with 'the mechanical arts', i.e. firearms, as an uncivilized activity that should be reserved for commoners. Yet, de la Noue argues that commoners abused such weapons and that only scholarly disciplined nobles should be allowed to use them because this type of person should have the necessary mathematical knowledge necessary in order to calculate with precision how guns should be loaded and fired.

The use of firearms was a particular challenge for the noble knights, and the problem was far more than the simple tactical one of armour against a bullet or, somewhat later, shells against mounted, armoured knights. The three famous battles of Crécy (1346), Poitiers (1356), and Agincourt (1415) showed again and again that commoners who were archers could cause serious problems for mounted knights, albeit the commoners were inferior in rank. Groups of mounted knights were also part of the forces of the English and the Dukes of Anjou. The social and political problem was obvious: it created a social disorder in which commoners could kill higher-ranked chevaliers whereas duels were only held between equals in social standing. Later, guns created the same disorder, and from the 1440s this was to the disadvantage of the English. The social and political misery created with the problems of knights is probably similar to the problems of being 'Western' and supplied with immensely costly and elaborate and technically revolutionized capacities, but faced by war enemies such as Vietnam, Algeria, Afghanistan, and Iraq who are poorer and less technologically advanced. Hence, the failures are repeated and, as a tragic paradox, in the Battle of the Somme in 1916, British officers were in front when they attacked German machine guns. This was, however, what de la Noue found a solution for: knights should be officers and thereby they would be in better control of not only the artillery, but also the logistics behind military forces.

Officers, not knights, were about to institutionalize the new role for nobles. To satisfy Henri IV, de la Noue advised calling up 2,000 cadets to the new

military schools (Corvisier 1992: 335). At the same time officers, whose military education was more advanced, attended Maurice of Nassau's famous Dutch academies. The estate hierarchy of grand nobility down to lower nobility was applied to officers at this time, but their counterparts 100 years later would be known as marshals, generals, colonels, captains, and lieutenants. The order of the estates, however, offered quite a different social, political, legal, economic, symbolic, and even scientific and aesthetic form than the hierarchy of military order. De la Noue argues for a new kind of army that was soon implemented in France and in the Netherlands under Maurice of Nassau, in Sweden under Gustavus Adolphus, and in England under Oliver Cromwell (Roberts 1973).

Whereas the Spanish *tercio* was an extremely strong but virtually immobile square, more than 50 ranks deep, of between 2,500 and 6,000 men armed with pikes and shots, the French Wars of Religion made smaller groups necessary. This actually also corresponded to the hierarchical ranks and created less political disturbances; it was in line, too, with the more decentralist principles favoured by Calvinism and better applied to troops scattered in provinces. Later, Maurice of Nassau was to establish even smaller companies with only 550 men, similar to the Roman cohorts, whereas Gustavus drew the line at companies of not more than 200 men, four to eight deep in formation.

Conclusion: an early separation of powers

It is certainly an exaggeration to observe only military professionalization as decisive for the new role of the military, not to say the state. Professionalization was generalized as a phenomenon in which the abstraction of duties and behavioural codes conditioned a new form of membership in the different corps of the emerging state. The emergence of the new and, according to de la Noue, "modern" military officer, was part of a larger and more generalized process that was concerned with a new form of inclusion, of abstraction, and of professionalization of power.

Power escaped its religious form linked to the Catholic Church but it did not escape theological semantics. Rather, theological semantics were transformed into a more universalist form, when the idea of a *corpus spiritus* with its semantics of inclusion and excommunication, rituals of communion, presence/absence, representation, and delegation, for example, was superseded by a semantics of *esprit de corps*. After the 1770s, the term 'organization' replaced the organic idea of parts and wholes, specifically with the double concept of "organization and reorganization" (van Rossum and Böckenförde 1978). Thereby, a reinforced temporal notion of 're-form', not to say '(r)evolution', took power over the hitherto idea of a synchronic form of power in which power was about coordination as a synchronization of social orders and accelerated synchronization of reforms. This "reform fever" as the Bavarian Prime Minister, Maximilian von Montgelas, called it was indebted to reforms that had begun with the Renaissance idea of a central perspective that could compare different parts or sections and replace them according to notions of rotation. An important part of this reform and

reorganization concept was that officers could be removed from their traditional positions and replace their loyalty towards feudal land and families with a discipline that included an attachment to a new body politics of an organizational "system" (Bodin 1961: 1056; Friedrichs 1996). Thus, the very innovation of reform was conditioned by such a stabilization of forms, office holding, central perspective etc. that made the meaning of 're-form' visible. Yet before this particular (r)evolution could take place in the era of Enlightenment, the version that emerged in the Renaissance took absolute power over its own power and its 'reason of state'.

At least four grand corps acquired this more professional form in France during the last decades of the sixteenth century. First, reformation and counter-reformation instituted new and far more theological competencies for the devoted priesthood. Second, the state officials were no longer commissioned only to carry out specific tasks but to adopt more permanent functions in what later became known as the state bureaucracies. Third, lawyers and judges transformed into a profession distinguished again from the professionalized chancelleries which, especially after Michel de l'Hôpital's administration in the mid sixteenth century, specialized only in legal matters (d'Aguesseau 1819). Fourth, the military officer began to have a career forged in the military academies. Together with academics searching for validation and a wish to tell the truth through the mediums of reasoning and doubt in combination with deliberation and writing, these forms of professionalization celebrated a concept of *devotion*, which Max Weber much later formulated as a meritocracy of *Beruf*, meaning that a job was bestowed on a person because of superior talent, not because of their birth or wealth.

However, after the era of Enlightenment, research became an independent and autonomous profession, simply because the demand for educated elites was so overwhelming that academics became hybrids attached to services in order to gain power. In fact, a full functional differentiation of corresponding organizational systems did not occur before a more structural separation of powers, which in France took place with the legal and administrative reforms in 1738 (Phytilis 1978: 111ff.). Accordingly, the rupture with the noble heritage of the ancient regime was more clearly distinguished with the military schools of the mid eighteenth century in St Petersburg and in France, which had the *École Royale Militaire*.

The very modern Prussian academy, however, continued to base its recruitment on nobles (Paret 2007). Noble virtues and lines of heritage to professions were not disrupted before the world wars, but during these a more universal conscription into the rank and file of military officers took place than ever seen before – apart from during the early years of the French Revolution. Still, the higher ranks in Europe, from Winston Churchill to the generals of the *Wehrmacht* were distinctively more noble and aristocratic than the lower officers, to say nothing of the common soldiers. This belated modernization of military professionalization, however, does not mean that noble semantics, codes, and forms have left the modern military. Some, such as Victor Hanson or John Keegan,

may maintain the view that the military organization has not fundamentally changed since the Greek hoplit and its corporate spirit. This view cannot be sustained in a larger modern sociological analysis, since the military organizations are dependent upon their structural coupling to other social forms that are functionally differentiated from organizations such as corporate bodies, financial institutions, hospitals, universities etc. The state was not established before these corps and an umbrella body with the name 'state' did not begin to rule the political and social orders before 1635 at the earliest, with the Catholic French monarchy's entry into the Thirty Years' War on the Protestant side. Accordingly, the French monarchy had to find a new name for the hitherto Catholic monarchial republic and invented *l'état*, (the state). Today, this semantic heritage, its forms, and even its heritage of types of reforms are departures from Renaissance reforms.

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